

THINKING BEYOND THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION: KWAME GYEKYE IN PERSPECTIVE¹

David A. OYEDOLA²

Department of Philosophy, Obafemi Awolowo University
Ile-Ife, Nigeria

E-mail: doyedola@oauife.edu.ng

Olusola Victor OLANIPEKUN³

Department of Philosophy, Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife, Nigeria

E-mail: olanipekuno@oauife.edu.ng



Abstract. This paper examines the moral foundation of political corruption analysed by Kwame Gyekye with the goal of offering a pragmatic solution to the phenomenon. The aim is that, beyond the moral foundation, the pragmatic approach will aid the eradication, or considerably minimize the problem of political corruption in the human society. It posits that what most philosophers and social scientists write concerning the nature and extent of political corruption can be categorised as normative, which supports the view that political corruption is enshrined in morality. Looking beyond the realm of theory, the paper argues that there are practical ways to view the issue under consideration. The study submits that (i) the negative impacts which political corruption has on the society causes practical problems than moral, and (ii) that political corruption needs practical/pragmatic solutions than the moral/theoretical ones provided by Gyekye. The study adopts the method of conceptual analysis and clarification.

Keywords: Political Corruption, Moral Foundation, Practice, Human Society, Normative.

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² ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0313-2562

³ ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4324-9503



1. Introduction

The philosophical analysis of the subject of political corruption has checkered history. The history dates back, at least, to the era of Sophists, when the Committee of the Senate charged eight military generals that they were guilty of losing 25 ships and 400 men during the war of Athens with Sparta. The decision was that these generals who were charged with negligence should be brought to trial. When the persecutors threatened to add the name of Committee members to the list of generals, only Socrates stood his ground and the rest of the Committee capitulated. Apart from the fact that the history of political corruption can be traced to the era of the Sophists, it also has historical antecedent in some other cultures, particularly the African culture. That is, the historical analysis of political corruption is holistic. Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Moses Mákindé, Claude Ake, Amilcar Cabral, Ngugi Wa 'Thiong 'o, Moses Òkè, Kwame Appiah, and Kwasi Wiredu discussed the nature of political corruption having Africa in mind. This means that political corruption is not limited to a particular culture or discourse.

There are two classical examples to show that political corruption cuts across cultures. One, scholars like Molefe, Ramose, Metz, Lougheed, Fámákinwá, Balogun, and Woldegiorgis have insisted that the way the African states have attributed the ultimate moral values which lies in the individual property or individualism to the community (i.e., communalism) shows a clear preference for the emergence of political corruption. Or, that the collapse of individualism into communitarianism by those supporting communitarian standards can only be achieved through political corruption. Thus, community-centred morality thrives at the expense of individualcentred morality (Balogun et al., 2024, pp.1241-1242). And two, there was a time that the political corruption in Athens led by the Senate made sure Socrates was guilty by association, by being the teacher of traitors. By this time, "irritation had developed into distrust against Socrates, and that led to him being brought to trial on the charge that he was not worshipping the gods whom the State worships, and of corrupting the young" (Stumpf et al., 2003, pp.44-45). This shows that political corruption has its basis in the kind of mindset which leaders have. The proof for the political corruption staged against Socrates prompted Plato to leave politics into philosophy. Plato saw the "inability of the Athenian democracy to produce great leaders, and saw also the way they treated one of its greatest citizens, Socrates" (Stumpf et al., 2003, pp.47-48). Plato alludes to the existence of political corruption in Athens, especially, through the execution of Socrates. This made him disillusioned about politics, prompting him to divert



from an active life of public service, into teaching that "rigorous knowledge must be the proper training of the ruler" (Stumpf *et al.*, 2003, p.48). If the ruler fails to be properly trained, the society will be immersed into deep political corruption and could even corrupt the ruler.

Furthermore, the subject of political corruption also, has as traces, in the epochal movements from the middle or dark ages given the ways the Church governed the affairs of men and the State at that time, to the renaissance, and through the early modern to the contemporary era. Moreover, Plato had envisaged political corruption when he admits in his Political Philosophy, that "wars have their origin in desires which are the most fruitful source of evils both to individuals and the state" (Stumpf *et al.*, 2003, p.65). The implication of this is that those who control the state have developed desires which are strong enough to fuel political corruption to the extent of leading the people to unnecessary wars.

Political corruption has been a recurring theme for a very long time. In The Republic, Socrates discusses the knowledge of the political circumstances in which the conversation about the principles of politics took place. This, as Plato puts it, took place in the era of political decay (i.e., this decay was caused by corruption) of Athens, to the extent that Socrates and the chief interlocutors were greatly concerned with that decay and thinking of the restoration of political health (Strauss *et al.*, 1963, p.8). The conclusion seems disturbing: Socrates made radical proposals for reform, but the indications in the Republic is that the longed-for reformation is not likely to succeed on the political plane (i.e., that at the level of the State or community, reformation is no visible because of the level of political decay that has happened), meaning that the only possible reformation is that of individual man. One of the examples cited by Plato in the political decay that has engulfed the state is the way justice has been bastardized when it becomes the advantage of the stronger. He calls this the Savage Thesis of Justice. The other aspect of the decay or corruption is how "the rulers themselves need the art of persuasion in order to persuade their subjects that the laws, which are framed with exclusive regard to the benefits of the rulers, can also serve the benefits of the subjects" (Strauss *et al.*, 1963, p.13).

Apart from looking at the historical antecedent of the nature of political corruption, the objective of the study is to consider the level at which political corruption has gained prominence by considering the African part to it. This part is presented by Kwame Gyekye. His perspective or consideration takes political corruption to be so disturbing. He insists on tracing or identifying the moral aspect or foundation to the discourse on political corruption. The perspective from which he identified the problem of political corruption is that it is a moral pollution or problem.



This paper is divided into 4 main sections. While the first section considers Gyekye's account of political corruption, the second section focuses on political corruption in the politics of traditional African society. The third section discusses the moral circumstances of political corruption in connection with the substantive moral revolution, as well as commitmental moral revolution. Meanwhile, the last section focuses on replacing the moral foundation of political corruption with pragmatic solutions from the African experience. This section discusses two specific arguments such as the external solution argument and the internal solution argument.

2. Kwame Gyekye on political corruption

At first, Gyekye sees political corruption as the kind of corruption that involves rulers and other public officials who run the affairs of a state or a political community (Gyekye, 1997, p.192). He believes the following: One, that the phenomenon of political corruption manifests itself more often in some societies than in others. Two, that political corruption is more widespread and pervasive in some societies than in others. And three, that it produces more devastating effects on some societies than on others. As much as these perspectives may be pointing towards a kind of truth, he streamlined them to a particular culture, the traditional setting of Africa. This leads to how he distinguishes between many themes as they concern or relate with limiting political corruption to Africa and morality.

In attempting to articulate what political corruption means, Gyekye says that political corruption refers to "the illegal, unethical, and unauthorized exploitation of one's political or official position for personal gain or advantage" (Gyekye, 1997, p.193). His reason is that political corruption is an act of corruption perpetrated against the state or its agencies by a person holding an official position in pursuit of his own private or personal profit. In another sense, he refers to the victim of political corruption as invariably the fortunes, resources, and interests of the state or the body politic. Political corruption, as he says, does not serve the ends of the state. This reiterates a kind of social virus. By this, he admits that political corruption serves the personal ends of individuals or group of individuals who involve themselves in it.

Gyekye highlights a number of things with which political corruption can be said to be associated with. One, it is associated with the acceptance of bribe. Two, it is associated with graft, fraud, nepotism, kickbacks, favoritism, and misappropriation of public funds. Four, public officials exploit their official positions for their own advantage. Five, public official like the head of state who stealthily and fraudulently takes huge sums of money from his state and



deposits them in foreign banks; the public official who receives a bribe would enjoin other public officials to be committing acts of political corruption.

Political corruption involves reciprocities between the public official and the other beneficiary of the corrupt act. In The State as a Giant Person, Plato posits that "our needs are not limited to our physical requirements, for our goal is not simply survival but a life higher than an animal's" (Stumpf *et al.*, 2003, p.65). By this, Plato is asking those whom Gyekye seems to be referring to never to make political corruption a way of life. Gyekye warns that "the way a political system operates can give rise to political corruption" (Gyekye, 1997, p.194). The system of politics in which ascension to political office depends very much on the goodwill and financial contributions of some individuals to the electoral campaigns of a candidate for a political office, as Gyekye asserts, could help in creating some kind of understanding that the successful candidate will reciprocate those contributions with appropriate rewards of various kinds. (Gyekye, 1997, p.194). Plato believes that this kind of corruption can be removed from within the State "when the philosophic element in society could attain dominance" (Gyekye, 1997, p.194).

What is this philosophic element, espoused by Plato? It is a vantage-point from which we can discern in all cases what is just for a community or state and for individuals. (Stumpf *et al.*, 2003, p.67). This is described as follows: that, the human race will not be free of evils until either the stock of those who righty and truly follow philosophy acquire political authority, or the class who have power in the cities be led by some dispensation of providence to become real philosophers (Stumpf *et al.*, 2003, p.67). This is the vantage-point; the point at which philosophy or philosophic element becomes what political leaders or rulers must adopt in their spirit, soul, body, and society to guide all human, social, rational, and political actions, activities, and/or endeavours. The issue which Gyekye has with Plato's description is that the political system can corrupt an elected political official. When the public official decides to reward his electoral benefactors and others, he involves himself in political corruption.

The next question to ask is 'under what social or political system can corruption thrive or flourish?' The first response by Gyekye is that "political corruption can flourish under weak leadership". This leads to the second point, with Gyekye seeing a social system as "an explanatory factor in the frequent incidence of political corruption" (Gyekye, 1997, p.194). The latter response prompted Gyekye's attachment to how political corruption manifests itself in the traditional setting of Africa. The postcolonial Africa, he says, is undeniably among the worst



victims of political corruption (Gyekye, 1997, p.195). His reason can be seen in his perception of the postcolonial states. In the postcolonial states, he says that governments are generally perceived as distant or objective entities whose activities have little bearing on the welfare and the daily lives of the citizens, and to whose activities the citizens, in consequence, have very little ideological and emotional attachment (Gyekye, 1997, p.195).

If a social or political system can be a cause for political corruption, Gyekye is establishing another condition or factor, which he calls the poor economic circumstances. The poor economic circumstances of a country may also be noted as a causal factor in the incidence of political corruption. Such economic circumstances may lead to inflation and the erosion of salaries, which may in turn, depress the material or financial circumstances of public officials, making it impossible to make ends meet and to make ordinary life bearable (Gyekye, 1997, pp.196-197). This is the same perspective which John Jones admitted in his work Multiculturalism and Welfare Reform. His reason for instituting welfare reform is because political corruption causes poverty. This poverty disproportionately affects not only the people of colour but also women and children of all races and cultures (Jones, 1998, p.559). Moreover, Gyekye did not limit political corruption to poor nations and postcolonial African traditional societies or nations. It can also occur in wealthy nations. In rich nations, political corruption occurs throughout the various echelon of officialdom, infecting officials at all levels.

In spite of Gyekye's allusion to the fact that political corruption manifest itself in the traditional settings of Africa or that it is more peculiar to the postcolonial Africa, he connects this with what he later admits, that, "political corruption may be said to have insinuated itself into the culture of the people" (Gyekye, 1997, p.197). He posits that it would not be correct to speak of a culture of political corruption for several reasons: One, political corruption is not a purposively created cultural product having a value for the people of a society as a whole. And two, political corruption cannot be undertaken publicly; an act of political corruption is always a furtive act, a clandestine operation (Gyekye, 1997, p.198). The implication is that political corruption is not a culturally determined practice or norm, for not all the people, not even the public officials, who grow up in a culture come to internalize it, subsequently valuing and involving themselves in it.

Gyekye points out another causal factor for political corruption. As he says, this is not a culturally determined practice, which is as a result of the distinction he made between culture and society. The reason is premised on the prevalence and persistence of certain undesirable



acts, such as violence, that occur in frequently in human societies, which may prompt calling or speaking of the culture of violence. It is also puzzling that in most attempts to provide a causal explanation for the incidence of rampant political corruption, the moral circumstances are generally ignored or are mentioned only in passing, and are thus, regarded as peripheral to the phenomenon of political corruption. It is this moral circumstance that is up for discussion. But before the moral circumstance, he discussed political corruption in the politics of traditional Africa.

3. Political corruption in the politics of traditional African society

Gyekye's position on the nature or extent and limits of political corruption in the politics of traditional Africa points to the fact that political corruption is a feature, not only of colonial and postcolonial, but also of traditional African polity. This leads Gyekye to say that: the growth or advancement of political corruption was undoubtedly fostered by the colonial and postcolonial political systems with their more elaborate bureaucracies and complicated ways of achieving their goals. This prompted how political corruption aided the rise of fresh opportunities for illegitimate and immoral political, economic, and social gains. The traditional polity which operated within a less complex society evolved simple bureaucracies. Even so, it cannot at all be denied that political corruption does exist in the traditional systems of politics and administration in Africa. There is a great deal of evidence to indicate that corruption was rife among the traditional officialdom (Gyekye, 1997, pp.201-202).

The traditional African society is not free from political corruption. In the traditional African society, the offer of gifts to people in authority or in some respectable position in society is a common feature. The existence of the institution of sanctions is not only the attempt that has been made to check the growth of political corruption, but as Olúfémi Táíwò interrogates, "the rejuvenation of African agency and to making Africa able, once again, to govern itself and move in tandem with the world in humanity's march of progress, but the template from which this great future was to be fashioned was forged" (Taiwo, 2021, p.55). This is what led Gyekye to introduce the institution of sanctions. This is because political corruption is a moral problem, prompting a new satisfactory approach in dealing with the nature of corruption, looking for profound changes in the moral beliefs and behaviour of both the leadership and followership of the society.



4. The moral circumstances of political corruption

What prompted Gyekye's assertion that "political corruption is essentially or fundamentally a moral problem; a moral pollution of officialdom as well as of the wider society" is because it is a kind of corruption that infects individuals holding public office, while the victims are the resources, interests, and/or public fortunes (Gyekye, 1997, p.203). But in order to make sure that the moral circumstances that may prompt political corruption are no longer there, Gyekye says that "the political system or process must be improved, its weaknesses removed, economic situations be improved, and salaries be improved" (Gyekye, 1997, p.203).

Gyekye later admits that "none of the attempts at dealing with the problem of political corruption will eradicate it or considerably minimize it" (Gyekye, 1997, p.203). The reason for this, as he opines, is "because moral circumstances do not come to the fore in the causal explanations of the incidence of political corruption, but that the factor of morality does not also feature prominently either, in the attempts to deal with the problem, how to deal with the moral character of offenders has not often formed part of the arsenal of techniques advocated for fighting political corruption" (Gyekye, 1997, p.204).

What appears disturbing regarding the root cause of the moral circumstances of political corruption are the morally unacceptable patterns of public behaviour like greed, avarice, and an inordinate desire for ostentatious living which has been allowed to run berserk which blunts the moral visions of the people inside and outside the government. Thus, political corruption is fundamentally a moral problem. To resolve the problem of political corruption, Gyekye introduced the concept of moral revolution. Moral revolution, he says, is a revolution in morals (Gyekye, 1997, p.205). This moral revolution, he posits, has two features which are substantive and commitmental. Moral revolution itself, Gyekye insists, is specie of the concept of revolution. It is a revolution of morals. Morals, here, is known to be distinguished between moral belief and moral commitment. The former involves moral facts, it is a basis for the latter and prior to it, but it does not determine it. Thus, substantive moral revolution got its cue from moral belief and moral commitment, because these two senses of morality logically lead to revolution to this substantive revolution (Gyekye, 1997, p.206).

5. The substantive moral revolution

This type of revolution, as Gyekye puts it, involves fundamental shifts in the existing moral paradigms or moral conceptual schemes and the adoption of new ones. This kind of revolution



insists that the old moral order or scheme radically change and yield place to a new order. The moral revolution of this kind is a fact of moral change. This does not mean that every kind of moral change constitutes moral revolution in the substantive sense. A moral change may be superficial, but profoundly affecting the existing basic moral structure, coming from a far-reaching moral change that affects the existing moral structure in a fundamental way which can appropriately be described as moral revolution (Gyekye, 1997, p.206). Substantive moral revolution may be enmeshed not only in radical changes in the religious, but even more markedly in radical changes in socio-political revolution, in the transformation of the existing socio-political structure.

Gyekye says that the reason for the basic transformation of the existing socio-political structure is that every socio-political is basically a moral issue. The ultimate impulse of this issue is that it leads to socio-political revolution, which can generally be said to be moral. The nature of this morality is the concern for human interests and welfare (Gyekye, 1997, p.207). The motivating factors of this socio-political revolution is what makes socio-political revolutionaries to stand against widespread official corruption, the self-aggrandizement of rulers and public officials, the glaring social injustices and economic inequalities, the concentration of wealth of the nation in the hands of the selected few to the detriment of the well-being of the broad masses of the population, and so on.

Substantive moral revolution, according to Gyekye, may be an unconscious process, which was not produced by an individual or a group of individuals at a specific time as such, but may result from far-reaching changes in socio-economic circumstances. This type of revolution may be a genuine response to the inadequacies of the existing moral beliefs and values. Such a response may be a conscious one, when it is authored or produced by an individual or a group of individuals disillusioned and disenchanted with the conventional morality produced by the socio-political system to which they belong because they consider it inadequate to new social realities (Gyekye, 1997, p.208). The existing moral beliefs and values, which substantive moral revolution describes, are explicitly held as inadequate to a particular social reality.

6. Commitmental moral revolution

This refers to the type of revolution which causes fundamental changes in the attitudes and responses of individual members of a society toward the moral beliefs, values, and principles of the society. It involves the adoption of new attitudinal or orientational paradigms with respect



to the existing morals. It involves making a new and positive commitment to known and accepted moral rules and principles. Gyekye makes it clear by admitting that this form of revolution can be affected either by augmenting the amount of moral knowledge we possess or by giving our moral knowledge a more precise and coherent formulation, or most probably, by both (Gyekye, 1997, p.210).

Gyekye's way of knowing or understanding the commitmental moral revolution is simple: a man may know and may even accept a universal moral rule such as that, it is wrong to collect bribes in the course of the performance of his official duties. But he may fail to apply this universal rule to a particular moral situation he is confronted with (Gyekye, 1997, p.210). One direct implication of this is that such a man is not able to transit from knowledge to action. However, a commitmental moral revolution, for Gyekye, can be affected neither by augmenting the compendium of our moral knowledge, nor by making most acute, our awareness of universal moral rules (Gyekye, 1997, p.211). In Gyekye's words, "it must be borne in mind that the successful operation of the socio-legal institutions of a society requires demonstration of very high moral standards in those men and women who run them. If those officials who are to run the affairs of our society and who are to enforce the prescriptions of the law are in themselves corrupt to the core, how can the law itself be enforced?" (Gyekye, 1997, p.213).

It is noteworthy that the combination of substantive and commitmental forms of revolution could have been influenced by or could have influenced a notable scholar like Andrew Carnegie. In his work Wealth, he admits that "the problem of our age is the proper administration of wealth, so that the ties of brotherhood may still bind together the rich and the poor in harmonious relationship" (Carnegie, 1998, p.587). This first point of call for this bond is the total elimination of political corruption. Political corruption, he says, has created a clear-cut demarcation between the palace of the millionaire and the cottage of the laborers. For him, this measures the change which has come into civilization (Carnegie, 1998, p.587).

7. Replacing the moral foundation of political corruption with pragmatic solutions: the African experience

In the previous sections, we have pointed out the major claims of Gyekye's moral foundation of political corruption. We have also considered the moral/theoretical solution that Gyekye offered to the problem of political corruption and discovered that the problem still persists on a large scale. However, beyond the moral/theoretical solution, the pragmatic solutions to the



problem of political corruption should also be given a consideration in order to considerably reduce the problem.

Gyekye's submission remains theoretically relevant. As he says "little, if any stress, has been put on the moral circumstances of corruption, morality lies at the core of the phenomenon of political corruption. Thus, for me, political corruption is fundamentally a moral problem" (Gyekye, 1997, p.215). The question that easily comes to mind is, what aspect of morality did he tie the so-called moral problem to? The question is answered by the virtue of the fact that he tied morality/theoretical normative aspect. In our view, the pragmatic step to replacing Gyekye's theoretical solution (commitmental moral revolution) is to leave the realm of theory to practicalizing some steps for the eventual termination or considerable reduction in political corruption. Our submission in this paper is that practically relevant solutions to the problem of political corruption could be external or internal.

8. External solution argument

This argument involves the need for the ex-colonizers and international organizations to join the domestic civil societies in the fight against political corruption rather that aiding it. Essentially, this is about making sincere attempts to stop what make political corruption to thrive. Political corruption thrives more when most of the proceeds of the corruption are taking away from the country where the political leader leads the people. Examples abound. Former president Mobutu of Congo DR, General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, and host of others corrupt African leaders laundered money stolen from the treasuries of their various nations and starched them away in foreign accounts with the help of some foreigners.

Gyekye appears to have limited the scope of his analysis to pointing out what the problems of political corruption are by citing instances in Africa. However, Gyekye's overconcentration on the postcolonial Africa is alarming. The fact is that, political corruption is neither peculiarly African, nor traditionally African way of life. Gyekye seems to have forgotten that many African nations have been handed over, at one point in time or the other, to European or Western lords, who superintend or provide hegemonic supervision over the political, economic, and psychological affairs of these African nations. Thus, political corruption may have been indirectly put into the political affairs of the postcolonial Africa as a virus, probably to stop Africa from becoming fully developed. That is why, for a scholar like D.A. Masolo, the postcolonial quest for many African nations may relate to the problem of political corruption,



but the long period of Western domination of Africa and the subsequent request for independence by many African nations could have prompted the sowing of the seed of corruption or discord whether political, economic, or mental into the African way of life.

According to Masolo, for quite good reasons, "one of the dominant themes of postcolonial theory is the issue of identity" (Masolo, 1997, p. 283). Masolo concentrated on this issue largely because he was able to understand that if the issue of identity is resolved, it is most likely that other issues or problems like political corruption will follow suit (i.e., be resolved). Masolo understands the nature of the task at hand by admonishing that "colonialism is judged overwhelmingly for the political, social, and cultural ills associated with it" (Masolo, 1997, p.285). This, indirectly, is the genesis of corruption sown into the minds of the Africa people especially the greedy ones. It started during colonial contact and when some of the colonizers were forcefully ejected or asked to leave. They had to leave that virus behind. Thus, the problem now became a social problem that has eaten deep into the fabrics of the African people. It is not surprising that Olanipekun Olusola argues that the antidote to this problem of political corruption is right social reorientation (Olanipekun, 2021, p.3). This could also be a pragmatic solution to the problem by unlearning borrowed corrupt practices and relearning the traditional value of integrity that Africa is known for. Similarly, the issue of political corruption became so obvious, as Masolo can be interpreted, when "the overthrow of colonialism was to be replaced with another, and there was a pull toward the objective African identity" (Masolo, 1997, p.285). The corruption became the virus to forestall this attempt.

In fact, if we can sincerely interpret or acknowledge Masolo's stance that "because of the deeply political gist of the colonial/postcolonial discourse, we have come to think of our identities as natural rather than imagined and politically driven" (Masolo, 1997, p. 285). Consequently, it could be argued that political corruption was deliberately implanted into the African affairs in order to inhibit its development. Even as at today, the colonial powers, through agencies like IMF, World Bank, CIA, could influence some corrupt African personnel to remove governments from power, continue the allegiance to the West, and keep controlling the resources of many African nations. Thus, through alliance with some corrupt African leaders, political corruption has been a tool in the hand of the ex-colonizers to sustain their dominance or presence. Similarly, such corrupt activities also include serving as global or regional watchdog or castigating and arresting anyone who wants to stand against their control. In other



words, it pays the ex-colonial powers to allow or keep politically corrupt official or officials in government in order to perpetuate their continuous control or dominance.

9. Internal solution argument

The second argument is the internal solution argument. This argument focuses on the required internal steps that ought to be taken in order to address the problem of political corruption. One of the steps is to make sure that the political, economic, social, and personal antecedents or life of anyone who wants to become a public official be sincerely laid bare for total public scrutiny. Admittedly, one important problem that this perspective may face is the issue of the right to privacy. But if the individual who is interested in becoming a public official wants to keep his private life, he/she should be advised withdraw. Anyone willing to serve the public must be properly scrutinized for the people to know what they are choosing. Furthermore, anyone interested in serving the public should be made to sign an undertaking. The purpose is to enforce the practice of social responsibility, where the public official is held liable or responsible for all forms of corrupt practices under his/her watch. Part of the content of this responsibility is that such corrupt official should vacate the seat and be jailed for a considerable number of years. In essence, the pragmatic or practical step towards replacing Gyekye's moral solution to political corruption is to make sure that development becomes looking inward and not outward.

10. Conclusion

The paper admitted that a pragmatic or practical step can be taken to curb or terminate political corruption. The pragmatic step may appear overwhelming, but the love for one's society or State should propel embracing the practical step to remove political corruption. At least, looking at the history of political corruption suggests that the ancient Athenian polis had practiced it causing the conviction of both Socrates and Aristotle, and leading Plato from politics to philosophy. As a result, the paper replaced the moral basis for political corruption analysed by Kwame Gyekye in "Political Corruption: A Moral Pollution" with pragmatic solutions. The aim was that this will relegate the moral basis of corruption in the human society. It posited that what most social scientists write concerning the nature, extent, and limits of political corruption can be categorised as normative, which in turn supports the view that political corruption has moral basis for its course. And that most of the issues raised by Gyekye to support the moral basis of political corruption are not actually morally situated, but were unsolicited practical ways to view political corruption. The study submitted that the negative impacts which political

corruption has on the society including the future causes practical problems than moral. The study adopted the method of conceptual analysis and clarification.

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